Indonesia is a large country with many layers of bureaucracy (and perhaps corruption) that is foreign to Singapore. This makes it difficult to coordinate policies and form agreements which benefits the civil society.
According to Varkkey (2013), one key obstacle in the tackling of the transboundary haze problem would be the importance of patronage networks within the oil palm sector in Indonesia, especially in terms of knowledge and access to local markets, distribution systems, connections around local bureaucracy and business systems (Terjesen and Elam, 2009). Because of this, it has become the norm at least among the top tiers of the Indonesian plantation firms to possess a two-tier management structure that comprises of the board of directors and board of commissioners. Officially the former manages and represents the company and the latter supervises the directors (Rajenthran, 2002). However in reality, members of the board of commissioners and sometimes the board of directors are typically retired senior bureaucrats who could act as intermediaries with the state and perform "advisory and brokerage functions" on behalf of the company. This means that several political parties in power have direct links to those plantation interests and have the potential to encourage elites to favour arrangements that ensure domestic and regional political economic stability and market access to these natural resources, while providing a lack of incentives for effective regional environmental conservation.
Another pertinent struggle of reducing the occurrences and the severity of haze in the region would be resistances that are present at a ministerial level. There is a dearth of mutual cooperation among Indonesia's domestic institutions (Nguitragool, 2011), resulting in a hierarchy among government ministries in Indonesia. The Ministries of Forestry and Agriculture are the more powerful ministries, with greater mandate, manpower and financial resources (Tan, 2004). Even if the Environment Ministry has been the engine of Indonesia's environmental diplomacy and holds the mandate to negotiate environmental treaties, its officials barely wield decision-making authority over land and forest policy at the state level. They remain a junior ministry, unable to sway their higher-ups in favour of environmental policy.
Is this corruption? It seems like it when one compares this to the Singaporean way of governance where ministries possess equal power in swaying the House's final decisions. Ministries should be given equal power and bear foresight to implement policies that benefit civil society, not only within the home region but the region as well. No man is an island, and no country is one either.
References:
Nguitragool, P. (2011). Negotiating the Haze Treaty. Asian Survey, 51(2), 356-378.
Rajenthran, A. (2002). Indonesia: An overview of the legal framework of foreign direct investment. Paper presented at the ISEAS Working Papers: Economics and Finance, Singapore.
Varkley, H. (2013). Patronage politics, plantation fires and transboundary haze. Environmental Hazards.
Terjesen, S & Elam, A. (2009). Transnational entrepreneurs' venture internationalization strategies: A practice theory approach. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(5), 1093-1116.
Tan, A.K. J. (2004). Environmental laws and institutions in Southeast Asia: A review of recent developments. Singapore Year Book of International Law, 8, 177-192.
Another pertinent struggle of reducing the occurrences and the severity of haze in the region would be resistances that are present at a ministerial level. There is a dearth of mutual cooperation among Indonesia's domestic institutions (Nguitragool, 2011), resulting in a hierarchy among government ministries in Indonesia. The Ministries of Forestry and Agriculture are the more powerful ministries, with greater mandate, manpower and financial resources (Tan, 2004). Even if the Environment Ministry has been the engine of Indonesia's environmental diplomacy and holds the mandate to negotiate environmental treaties, its officials barely wield decision-making authority over land and forest policy at the state level. They remain a junior ministry, unable to sway their higher-ups in favour of environmental policy.
Is this corruption? It seems like it when one compares this to the Singaporean way of governance where ministries possess equal power in swaying the House's final decisions. Ministries should be given equal power and bear foresight to implement policies that benefit civil society, not only within the home region but the region as well. No man is an island, and no country is one either.
References:
Nguitragool, P. (2011). Negotiating the Haze Treaty. Asian Survey, 51(2), 356-378.
Rajenthran, A. (2002). Indonesia: An overview of the legal framework of foreign direct investment. Paper presented at the ISEAS Working Papers: Economics and Finance, Singapore.
Varkley, H. (2013). Patronage politics, plantation fires and transboundary haze. Environmental Hazards.
Terjesen, S & Elam, A. (2009). Transnational entrepreneurs' venture internationalization strategies: A practice theory approach. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(5), 1093-1116.
Tan, A.K. J. (2004). Environmental laws and institutions in Southeast Asia: A review of recent developments. Singapore Year Book of International Law, 8, 177-192.
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